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must allege that appellees acted in their capacities as union officials. Judge
Hastie's concurring opinion seems correct in so far as it would grant the
appellant leave to plead over.
DAVID S. WORONOFF
Labor Law—Seniority Rights As Vested Contractual Rights.—Zdanok
v. Glidden Company, Durkee Famous Foods Div.'—In a diversity action
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, five employees
sued their former employer for breach of contract. The dispute concerned
itself with the seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
covering a New York plant which the employer had closed when it trans-
ferred its operation to Pennsylvania. Pursuant to the agreement, the
employer terminated the contract and offered the employees the chance
to apply for similar positions in Pennsylvania, but without seniority
benefits. When arbitration failed to resolve the resultant seniority dispute,'
the employees brought this action alleging a denial of valuable contract
rights that had vested in them.
The district court held that the plaintiffs had standing as beneficiaries
of the bargaining agreement to enforce provisions made for their benefit,
but that the employer was not required to preserve for its employees
seniority status acquired under the expired New York agreement.3 On
plaintiff's appeal, this ruling was reversed. HELD: The seniority rights
were vested and were not lost when the agreement expired; accordingly,
the employees had seniority rights after the employer transferred the
plant from New York to Pennsylvania.4
The collective bargaining agreement in this case recited, in its preamble,
that it was made "for and on behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona
Avenue and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York."5 Judge
Madden of the United States Court of Claims, sitting by designation,°
in speaking for the majority found that this geographical description was
nothing more than an identifying address and would not be treated as
setting fixed boundaries on the scope of the contract.7 The court concluded
1 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, 82 Sup. Ct. 56 (1961) (No. 242).
2 Local 852, the plaintiffs' union, served on the defendant a notice of intention to
arbitrate certain designated disputes, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the union's
contract with the defendant. Defendants' motion to stay arbitration was granted on the
grounds that there was no arbitrable dispute. The court concluded its opinion with the
sentence: "It follows from all the foregoing that Glidden's motion to stay arbitration
must be granted, whatever other remedies the Union may have with respect to the
alleged disputes." Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172
N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
2 185 F. Supp. 441 (1960).
4 Supra note 1.
5 Id. at 103.
6 Judge Madden, who not only participated in the 2 to 1 finding but wrote the
opinion, was sitting by special designation of Mr. Chief Justice Warren.
7 A rational construction of the contract would seem to require that the state-
ment of location was nothing more than a reference to the then existing situa-
tion, and had none of the vital significance which the defendant would attach
to it. Contracts must, in all fairness, be construed ut yes magis valeat quam
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that, since the parties had contractually created seniority rights without
any area designation fixing boundaries upon the scope of the contract, the
court would not rewrite the contract and draw those boundary lines for
them. Chief Judge Lumbard wrote a dissenting opinion based on a dif-
ferent construction of the contract. He said: "The issue here is whether
this collective bargaining agreement gave the employees the right to follow
the work to the new site. I would hold that it did not." (Emphasis added.)8
The basis for this conclusion was the same as that of the district court,
namely, the absence of an express provision in the contract requiring
inter-plant transfer of seniority rights.
Seniority is a status achieved by employees through length of service.9
It gives rights under a contract with respect to jobs, and it has probably
done more to encourage union membership than any other protective feature
of the labor agreement.1° Seniority was, at first, a means by which employers
favored older, experienced, and more dependable workers. By giving
seniority privileges, the employer could reduce employee turnover, protect
his training investment, encourage skilled workers to remain with him,
and reduce their desire to take action which might jeopardize their job
security." As the principle of collective bargaining became recognized, and
ultimately required by the Wagner Act,'2 these privileges were converted
into valuable contract rights which insured employee job status.13
pereat. (That the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.) If not,
the reasonable expectations of the parties are sacrificed to sheer verbalism.
Supra note 1, at 103.
Id. at 105.
9 Brand v. Pennsylvania R.R., 22 F. Supp. 569 (ED. Pa. 1938); Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P.2d 971 (1934); George T. Ross Lodge v. R.R.
Trainmen, 191 Minn. 373, 254 N.W. 590 (1934); Unkovich v. New York Cent. R.R.,
128 N.J. Eq. 75, 174 Atl. 876 (1934), aff'd, 131 N.J. Eq. 468, 25 A.2d 893 (1942); Fine v.
Pratt, 150 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Gleason v. Thomas, 121 W.Va. 619,
5 S.E.2d 791 (1939).
A "The promise of job 'ownership' ... or the complete elimination of 'favoritism'"
was this encouragement. Knowlton, Recent Problems in Arbitration of Seniority Disputes,
9 Arb. J. (n.s.) 194 (1954). See also Seniority Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev., 156, 293 (1949); Seniority Provisions in Labor Con-
tracts: Social and Economic Consequences, 1 De Paul L. Rev. 191-215 (1952); cf. Zook,
Seniority as a Property Right, 30 Dicta 133 (1953).
11 Lapp, How to Handle Problems of Seniority 2-3 (1946). Seniority systems should
consist of a series of principles which are highly flexible in their application. Leonard
R. Sayles, in an article written for the Harvard Business Review, explored this proposi-
tion, and in so doing, made the following observation:
. . . idea that seniority provides a rigid system for allocating jobs, and that
disputes on the subject only arise on the "seniority v. ability" principle is not
realistic. Seniority is not an exact measuring rod but rather a highly flexible in-
strument subject to use by all groups in the pursuance of their own interests.
Those who wish to understand seniority, therefore, will not be totally informed
after a mere reading of the contract. They must go out and observe the men
in the plant, changing and adjusting their relations with each other through the
manipulation of seniority. Sayles, Seniority: An Internal Union Problem,
Harv. Bus. Rev. 55, May-June, 1952.
See Note, 38 Va. L. Rev. 655-68 (1952); Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 240 (1953).
12 NLRA, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. II 151-66 (1958).
13 Lapp, op. cit. supra note 11, at 3; See also Harbison and Coleman, Goals and
Strategy in Collective Bargaining 39 (1951).
297
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW) REVIEW
, 
An employee's rights of seniority are contractual in origin, effective
only to the extent provided in the contract which creates them and only
against the parties bound thereby." A leading Massachusetts case,"
various federal courts, and the Supreme Court, have come to similar con-
clusions in holding that, in the absence of any contractual provision to
the contrary, all contractual rights of employees terminate on the expiration
of the collective bargaining contract creating such rights."
In Elder v. New York Cent. R.R.," an employee brought an action
for damages for loss of wages arising out of a failure of the railroad to
reinstate him after he had been laid off. It appeared that after fourteen
years of employment, he had seniority recall rights under a collective
bargaining contract between a railroad brotherhood and the railroad
Jobs of the nature of plaintiff's were affected by a consolidation of opera-
tions by the railroad after his lay-off. After a dispute between the union
and the railroad arose out of this consolidation, a new agreement was
entered into terminating the prior agreement, and providing for termination
of plaintiff's seniority recall rights. In considering the nature of the
seniority rights, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that,
"the authorities are uniform to the effect that collective bargaining
agreements do not create a permanent status, give an indefinite tenure,
or extend rights created and arising under the contract beyond its life,
when it has been terminated in accordance with its provisions." (Emphasis
14 In Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N.E. 705 (1934), it was said:
Although a right of seniority such as is here asserted is undoubtedly valuable
property, it arises only from agreement. We see no illegality in a rule that one
who acquires seniority in a particular place and who is entitled to carry it
with him to another, must reckon seniority in that other place from the time
at which the right to its exercise in that other place accrued to him. One is not
deprived of property thereby. (Emphasis added.)
See Carver v. Obrien, 315 Ill. 643, 43 N.E.2d 597 (1942); Cf. Ryan v. New York
Cent. R. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 NW. 365 (1934).
15 Donovan case, supra note 14.
16 Elder v. New York Cent. R.R., 152 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1945) ; System Federation
No. 59 v. Louisiana & A. Ry., 119 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1941); Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 363
U.S. 593 (1960), infra note 22. See also Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge 727 v.
Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949) ; Local Lodge No. 2040, International Association of
Machinists v. Serve!, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959) ; UAW v. Federal Pacific Electric
Co., 36 LRRM 2357, 28 CCH Lab Cas fl 69,274 (D. Conn. 1955).
In the UAW case, supra, the Connecticut court held that a five-year collective bar-
gaining contract containing seniority, retirement, and pension provisions did not create
any right of action in contracting union and its members on account of employer's sudden
closing of plant covered by contract and removal of operations to another state. Compare
this with a leading New York case involving the removal of a factory shown to be
solely for the purpose of discouraging, intimidating, and punishing its employees by
removing their hopes of re-employment by the corporation. The public policy of the
State of New York and of the Nation is opposed to the closing or removal of factories
for the purpose of intimidating or punishing employees by depriving them of the hope
of further employment. Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305, 173 A.L.R.
671 (1947). Significantly, in Glidden, the employees were offered the opportunity to be
re-employed at the new plant. Also there was a finding that the plant relocation was
based on sound economic principles. Supra note 3, at 443.
17 Elder, supra note 16.
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added.)'s The court concluded that the district court had properly dismissed
the action. The seniority rights in Elder were terminated by the adoption
of a new agreement, but a substitute agreement is but one of many ways
by which a contract and the rights thereunder are terminated.
In System Federation No. 59 v. Louisiana & A. Ry.,19 the employer
defended a damage action by a laid-off employee on the basis that his
seniority recall rights had terminated with the contract creating them.
The employee had been laid off in 1929 and had seniority recall rights
under the current collective bargaining contract. The employer in 1931
repudiated the contract and adopted seniority rules inconsistent with
plaintiff's rights under the 1929 contract. (These employee seniority rights
were, in 1937, written into a new contract.) The position of the employee
was that "once an employee, always an employee, once a senior, always a
senior."2° In holding that the action had properly been dismissed on the
grounds that the plaintiff's rights under the 1929 agreement terminated
when the agreement terminated in 1931, the court stated that "the rights
of the parties to work under the contract are fixed by the contract. They
persist during, they end with, its term."21 Hence, the seniority recall rights
of the employee in this case were lost in 1931 when the contract was
terminated by the employer's repudiation.
In each of the above cases, the court recognized and held that seniority
recall rights are coterminous with the contracts creating such rights. This
rule was most recently recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers.22 Onto
this background the Second Circuit and Judge Madden projected the
"Doctrine of the Glidden Case."23 In holding that seniority rights are
18 Id. at 364.
18 System-Federation, supra note 16.
22 Id. at 514.
21 Id. at 520.
22 Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., supra note 16. In this case the Court of Appeals
directed that the award of an arbitrator be abated to the extent that it provided for
back wages after the termination of a collective bargaining contract. The court held
further that the arbitrator's direction that the employees be re-employed was invalid
in view of the expiration of the contract. In so holding, the court stated, p. 331:
So it has generally been held that collective bargaining agreements do not
create a permanent status or condition, or give an indefinite tenure, or extend
rights created and arising under the contract beyond its life, but that these
rights remain in force only for the life of the contract unless renewed by
subsequent contract or preserved by statute.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the modification of the arbitration award by the
Court of Appeals, did not question the Court of Appeals' holding that seniority terminates
with the contract termination, unless otherwise provided, but held that the Court of
Appeals could not substitute its determination of whether the contract provided other-
wise for that of the arbitrator.
The concern here is not with the determination of a factual question by an arbitrator,
but rather with an interpretation of a contract by a district court. Accordingly, the
rule of the 4th Circuit that the scope, as well as the significance, of seniority must be
determined from the collective bargaining contract creating the seniority, is not affected
by the reversal of the Supreme Court.
23 This case has received considerable attention in the New York press since the
decision of the Court of Appeals had been handed down. See Arthur Krock, The New
York Times, Vol. CX, No. 37,827, p. 20, col. 3 (August 18, 1961).
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vested rights that extend beyond the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, the court rejected the principle that seniority rights are
coterminous with the contracts creating them. A critical factor in the
Glidden case was the existence of a contract provision calling for rehiring a
laid-off employee according to seniority. This lay-off provision could extend
from two to three years beyond the effective date of the contract, depending
on the individual employee's length of service.24 Judge Madden, in
seizing upon this factor, and the absence of a contractual provision to the
contrary, came to the conclusion that the seniority rights did not terminate
with the contract creating them. judge Madden specifically stated:
If one has in October a right to demand performance of the
corresponding obligation at any relevant time within a period of
three years, it would be strange if the other contracting party
could unilaterally terminate the right at the end of three weeks.
Of course the employee owning the right, or his authorized union
agent, could bargain away the employee's right. Nothing of that
kind occurred in the instant case (Emphasis added.)25
The Judge continued to say that while these rights arose solely out of
the terms of the contract, they were vested rights and the fact that the
contract was not renewed, and that other workmen in the future might not
have the opportunity to earn similar rights, was irrelevant. These rights
were "earned" and "vested" and could not be unilaterally annulled.2°
In Elder the seniority provisions relied on were modified by mutual
agreement between the union and the employer so as to deny the employee
the rights asserted. The action not being unilateral, the result in that case
is not in conflict with the Glidden decision. But the broad dictum of that
case, that seniority terminates with the contract creating it, has been
rejected by the Glidden court.27
Similarly the employer's unilateral repudiation of seniority rights in
1931 in System-Federation could not divest the employees of such rights,
according to Judge Madden. But in 1937 when the new contract was
bargained the seniority rights could be and were terminated.28 Thus the
result of the case is in line with the "doctrine" of the instant case. Ac-
cordingly, for these two reasons: (I) there being a provision for an extension
beyond the contract perioc1,29 and (2) the absence of a modification of such
24 (b) In instances of continuous layoff, seniority shall be terminated after:
(1) An employee with less than five years' continuous employment at the
time his layoff began is on a continuous layoff of two years; or
(2) An employee with more than five years' continuous employment at the
time his layoff began is on a continuous layoff of three years.
(c) Employees whose seniority is terminated due to continuous layoff shall re-
ceive first preference for employment before new employees are hired
Supra note 1, at 103.
28 Supra note 1, at 103.
86 Id.
87 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Cf. with notes 25 and 26, supra, and
their accompanying texts.
28 Cf. note 21, supra, and accompanying text with notes 25 and 26, supra, and their
accompanying text.
28 Supra note 24.
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seniority rights by a union-management agreements° it can be concluded
that Glidden would not change the results in the previously cited cases, but
certainly does overrule their rationale.
Chief Judge Lumbard agreed with Judge Madden that seniority
rights are contractual in origin; and if they are to persist beyond the term
of the collective bargaining agreement, the agreement must so provide or
be susceptible of such construction. Judge Lumbard read the contract as
not providing for such a construction.31 Judge Madden and the court read
it otherwise.32 Yet all agreed that such rights do vest to the extent that the
employer can not unilaterally repudiate such rights.
It is significant to note that the first and only case to arise since
Glidden has accepted its rule and interpreted that case quite broadly. In
Oddie v. Ross Gear and Tool Company,33 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan held that seniority was a vested right; it
continues despite the termination of the contract and removal of the plant
This opinion was rendered in the face of a contract which specifically
spelled out the "geographical boundaries" of the collective bargaining
agreement.34 The Oddie court cited Glidden as its only authority, quoting
"the employee owning the right, or his authorized Union agent, could bar-
gain away the employee's right[s] .""3 In Oddie, the issue was whether or
not the preexisting contract could be annulled unilaterally by the mere
moving of the defendant's plant to another state Like Glidden, then, the
issue resolved itself into the narrow question of contract interpretation. And,
like Glidden, the court interpreted the contract to provide for a continua-
tion of the seniority rights beyond the term of the contract creating them.
The Glidden controversy went to arbitration before this court action.
Unfortunately, the New York Supreme Court ruled that the dispute was
not covered by a narrowly drawn arbitration clause in the contracts°
Possibly Judge Madden's opinion is a reflection of his disagreement with
that holding. Today, because of rising labor costs and changing industrial
environments, many companies are facing relocation decisions. An added
consideration now before them is their contract status with their employees.
To what extent will seniority rights arising out of contracts entered into
prior to relocation bind them at their new location?
A possible solution for companies having such problems, is to seek
arbitration.37 The Supreme Court, as previously mentioned, has granted
3° Supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31 Supra note 7.
32 Supra note 8.
33 48 L.R.R.M. 2587, 195 F. Supp. 826 (E. D. Mich. 1961).
34 Cf. note 7, supra. In Glidden the geographical description appears in the pre-
amble to the contract, whereas in Oddie, this was a bargainable item that was included
in the body of the contract. Nevertheless, the Oddie court felt, as did the Glidden court,
that the contract "has no geographical limitations as to the benefits of the employees and
their rights under the contract." 195 F. Supp. 826, 830 (1961).
35 Supra note 1, at 103.
86 Supra note 2.
37 It is interesting to note that since the decision by the Glidden court, three cases
of plant removal allegedly violating employee's accrued rights have gone to arbitration.
Two of those disputes resulted in an award of damages and an order for the return of
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certiorari, but the review is limited solely to the question of whether the
participation of a federal Court of Claims judge in the ruling by the Second
Circuit invalidates that ruling.38 If the Supreme Court should invalidate
the proceeding, then a retrial is possible, and the court can reexplore the
whole legal jungle created by Glidden, in which industry, its contracts with
labor, and the courts are deeply entangled. But if the Supreme Court
sustains Judge Madden's participation, the interpretation of the Second
Circuit will stand39—that seniority rights to a job, provided for in a
contract, and not limited to any specific time or place therein, exist
anywhere the employer may be in business, unless waived by the employee
or bargained away by his union.
DAVID H. KRAVETZ
Negotiable Instruments—Rights of Employer's Fidelity Insurer Against
Collecting Bank on Employees Unauthorized Endorsement.—Aetna
Car. E.1 Sur. Co. v. Lindell Trust Co.1—A salesman of the insured, with no
authority to endorse checks payable to his employer, endorsed and cashed
three checks at the defendant Trust Company which, in turn, collected the
amounts of the checks from the drawee bank. Upon learning of the
fraudulent transaction, the insured demanded of the Trust Company
reimbursement of the total amount of the three checks. The demand was
refused, whereupon the insured made a claim against the insurer, Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company. The claim was satisfied and, in return, the
insured assigned all its right, title, and interest in and to any claims it may
have against the Trust Company to Aetna. Aetna brought suit against the
Trust Company allegedly for money had and received. The trial court
rendered judgment for the defendant, holding that it would be inconsistent
to allow Aetna to recover after it had paid the insured on its fidelity bond.
In further support of the judgment, the trial court found that Aetna's right
to recover was based upon and limited by the equitable doctrine of subroga-
tion. The Court of Appeals reversed. HELD: (1) Insured did not, by
demanding and receiving payment from the insurer, make such election as
to preclude the insurer from asserting its subrogation right against the
the "runaway" shop. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 L.A. 1364 (1961); Address—O—Mat,
Inc., 36 L.A. 1074 (1961). But see U.S. Steel Corp., 36 L.A. 940 (1961).
38 The issue raised grows out of the contention that the United States Court of
Appeals is a constitutional tribunal, and the United States Court of Claims is a legis-
lative body. The Supreme Court has previously been asked to settle this point as to all
the statutory federal courts involved, and the grant of review for this specific purpose
means it is ready to do so. If it should decide with the Glidden lawyers that the act
of Congress of 1953 attempted unconstitutionally to repudiate the classification (by the
Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 1933), that the Court of Claims
was a legislative and not a constitutional court, then the Second Circuit's ruling would be
vitiated by Judge Madden's participation.
30 "Should the Supreme Court leave this situation standing, however, it can be
corrected by Congress since the grounding of the appeals court decision appears to be in
equity and the implications found in long service, not in the Constitution of the United
States." Krock, op. cit. supra note 23, at 20.
1- 348 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1961).
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